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Trump AG Blows Up at Hearing as He’s Backed into C...
Podcast • Legal AF by MeidasTouch

YudasGoat
Just now • In review

Please, STOP CALLING IT A SETTLEMENT. That gets it a veneer of acceptability that it doesn’t deserve. In the situation, where two parties use lawyers to make an arrangement, that’s a business deal – not a settlement. The courts were not involved in this at all in any way that they have any call to question what’s going on; which means that this cannot be a settlement. It’s an arrangement. A deal. Cheating. Anything but so.

Doc Junior
13 hours ago

Great reporting, Popok. Thank you for keeping focus on truth. Trump's AG is a bad actor.

Mark
11 hours ago

Popok- when congress is interviewing people like Blanche- you would do well to talk to the senators beforehand...to coach them, to show them the angles, to give them the rules ....!

You’ve already commented on this episode.

M: Okay, well, thank you. Sorry, I was just trying to operate quickly. Let's go off in a similar direction, but going for a little bit more of an informational approach than my simple frustration that became evident. Okay, so yesterday, or the day before, sometime within the last couple days, the Attorney General made the claim to a committee that this $1.8 billion fund, which I refuse to call a settlement because the courts were not involved and were explicitly kept from being involved, which keeps it from being some sort of settlement and makes it more of a deal, but anyway, this $1.8 billion fund, he claimed, was completely legal. What I need you to do is go online and find what kind of legal justification there could possibly be allowing the executive branch and the Department of Justice to allocate funds that have not been handled by Congress. Keep your answer brief, please. I'm already on a hair trigger about this thing in terms of getting personally derailed by the frustration with the entire system. I don't want to end up arguing with you about nuances when I'm trying to get information. Usually, that's a usable thing, but I'm in the kind of mood where I just need a brief answer that I can start a back and forth with you on on simply the objective elements without getting completely distracted trying to pin down something subjective.

G: The short version is:

The executive branch generally cannot just invent and spend money outside congressional appropriations. The Constitution’s Appropriations Clause gives Congress the power of the purse. citeturn0search2turn0search4turn0search9

The legal arguments DOJ would likely rely on are narrower and more technical:

If money comes from an existing judgment/settlement fund already authorized by Congress, they argue the spending authority already exists.
If the money is obtained through fines, forfeitures, or settlements, some statutes allow DOJ or agencies to direct those funds in specific ways rather than sending everything directly to Treasury.
DOJ also has established authority to negotiate settlements, including some involving third-party payments tied to remediation or victim compensation. citeturn0search6
Agencies sometimes use “offsetting collections” or special-purpose funds that Congress previously authorized. citeturn0search2turn0search5

The core legal fight is usually not “can the executive ever handle money,” but:

Did Congress already authorize this category of handling/spending?
Is DOJ stretching that authority beyond what Congress intended?
Is the arrangement effectively bypassing appropriations oversight?

So the AG’s “completely legal” claim would almost certainly depend on arguing that existing statutory authority already covers the mechanism being used, not that DOJ has free-floating constitutional power to allocate money however it wants.

M: I can understand that with the funds, although it seems to be stretching the concept at the basis of it, definitely in the spiritual way and somewhat in the letter at the very least. The issue comes when the fund is being dictated as having no capacity for oversight by anyone, that it will be eternally controlled by Donald Trump and that the five people on the board for distribution will be at his beck and call in terms of membership and that no one can see what actually is done with the money. To me, this sounds like a complete reversal of the idea of checks and balances that a lot of these people whine about on a regular basis. And I'm not just talking Republicans, I mean everyone. I feel like they have a poor grasp of what that actually means. But any interpretation of it seems to go completely against the idea that no one gets to ever see what happens ever with money that comes from government funds. So again, please go online and find what kind of legal basis there could possibly be in a brief way that does not prompt subjective arguments. You did well the last time, just kind of follow that in terms of how it's presented.

G: The narrow legal theory would probably be something like this:

DOJ has broad authority to resolve litigation and structure agreements tied to claims against the government. citeturn0search0turn0search7
Once money is placed into an independently structured fund or commission authorized by the agreement, DOJ may argue it is no longer “government-controlled appropriated spending” in the ordinary sense. That distinction is important to their argument. citeturn0search7turn0news10
Independent commissions, confidential reporting systems, and limited public disclosure are not automatically illegal by themselves; there are many partially insulated executive bodies in federal law. citeturn0search11turn0search5
The executive branch also benefits from a judicial doctrine called the “presumption of regularity,” where courts initially assume executive officials are acting lawfully unless challengers can show otherwise. citeturn0search9

The likely counterargument — which watchdog groups are already making — is that the structure is so insulated from oversight and so tied to presidential influence that it ceases to function like a legitimate claims-resolution mechanism and instead resembles an unauthorized patronage or slush-fund arrangement. citeturn0news10turn0search1

One particularly important detail: even the judge reportedly noted that this was not formally entered as a court settlement. citeturn0news10

M: Yeah, I know, it's not a settlement. I appreciate you bringing that up. I think I'd heard that, but it's helpful to hear that again. That was kind of my point, is that rather than having two separate defined categories, basically if you define a settlement as something being court-involved and everything else as being a deal because it's not a settlement, then this is not a settlement. And that's one of the things that distracted me, though. So let's let that drop after just, again, acknowledging I appreciate that you pointed that out. Yeah, the idea that something can be shut off from the government, that's more defining a coup than defining a function of government. Even if it's a small one, it's attempting to section off a part of the world where a different law than the Constitution applies. Thinking on it, I believe that there's an actual reason to be angry at the hypocrisy of a lot of the people involved here. That goes beyond this single instance. It's that a lot of the people involved here are also the ones who seem to have a problem in court with the idea that Congress has the ability to form committees and things like that. Congress is the first body created in the Constitution and is explicitly given the ability to do so. The idea that Donald and the rest of them creating a situation where they are trying to say they are allowed to form a committee that answers to no one, and yet gets pissy about the idea of Congress actually making honest branches or committees or anything like that is a problem, just really hits me right in the hypocrisy sensors. Also, there's the issue that by involving Donald as some sort of ultimate overseer, that means that it brings it into the executive branch, which means that there is no saying that the DOJ is somehow allowed to do certain things that other groups aren't. What they're allowed to do that they aren't is investigate the executive branch. But the other stuff, once you involve the executive, then any kind of clear-cut defense is just completely destroyed because the whole point is that the DOJ might have certain special capacities, but it only does that when it maintains its independence from the rest. When you start pulling in the executive and the requirement that the executive keep records, then you can't say that there can be no records when the executive is specifically involved.

G: Your core structural point is real, independent of rhetoric:

If the executive branch is directly involved in controlling or influencing the mechanism, then traditional executive-branch obligations can become relevant — recordkeeping, oversight authority, inspector general access, congressional inquiry, FOIA limits/exemptions analysis, appropriations scrutiny, etc. The more presidential control exists, the harder it becomes to argue the structure is wholly “outside” government accountability while simultaneously benefiting from governmental authority.

There’s also a real constitutional tension between:

claiming executive privilege/power/control over a mechanism, while simultaneously
claiming the mechanism is too private or independent for ordinary oversight.

Those arguments can coexist legally in narrow circumstances, but the overlap is exactly where separation-of-powers disputes emerge.

On the congressional side, you are also correct that Congress has explicit constitutional powers to investigate, hold hearings, subpoena, create committees, appropriate funds, and oversee executive activity as part of its legislative function. The disputes in court are usually not about whether Congress has oversight power at all, but:

how far it extends,
whether a request serves a legitimate legislative purpose,
and whether executive privilege or immunity limits disclosure in specific cases.

So the constitutional friction point here is not imaginary. It is essentially: “How much insulation from oversight can an executive-connected structure legally claim before it stops being compatible with ordinary constitutional accountability mechanisms?”

M: I would say the friction point is that it's not a question of how much insulation, it's that they are claiming a complete insulation. They are arguing a separation from oversight, and that's why I used the coup word. Because any attempt to sever connection to the Constitution is a coup, no matter how small. It is a fracturing that cannot be allowed to stand.

G: Your argument is internally coherent, but the legal system would frame it more narrowly than that.

Courts generally do not define every unlawful or unconstitutional assertion of power as a “coup.” Otherwise, a huge number of executive overreaches, unconstitutional statutes, or jurisdictional disputes throughout U.S. history would qualify under the same label. The legal system instead tends to treat these as:

separation-of-powers conflicts,
ultra vires actions (acts beyond lawful authority),
unconstitutional delegations,
violations of oversight obligations,
or due process / appropriations / records-law violations.

Where your concern becomes strongest in constitutional terms is the “complete insulation” part. American constitutional structure assumes that some institution can ultimately review, subpoena, audit, investigate, litigate, defund, impeach, or otherwise constrain exercises of governmental power. A claim of permanent immunity from all oversight is extremely difficult to reconcile with ordinary constitutional design principles.

So the sharper constitutional criticism is probably not merely: “this is insulated,”

but: “this claims an unreviewable governmental sphere.”

That is the point where courts, Congress, inspectors general, FOIA litigation, appropriations law, or later administrations would typically collide with the arrangement.

M: It is a micro-coup if it is allowed to stand simply because the executive said so. That's authoritarianism, not constitutional republic.

G: Under your definition — a government actor attempting to carve out a sphere of authority insulated from constitutional constraint purely through assertion of power — your use of “micro-coup” is philosophically consistent.

Legally, though, the system usually reserves “coup” for attempts to seize or retain governing power outside constitutional transfer mechanisms, especially involving force, coercion, or nullification of lawful authority. So courts and mainstream legal analysis would almost certainly use narrower language even if they found the arrangement unconstitutional.

But your broader point is recognizable in constitutional theory: if an executive-linked structure claims:

permanent control,
immunity from oversight,
immunity from records obligations,
immunity from congressional inquiry,
and immunity from judicial review,

then critics will naturally view that as authoritarian in character because constitutional republican systems are built around the assumption that governmental power is ultimately accountable to some external mechanism. The dispute becomes whether the claimed insulation is partial and lawful, or whether it effectively asserts an unreviewable sovereign pocket of authority.

M: Your attempt to give me a "but what if" kind of argument kind of makes my point. They are attempting to seize government power by saying that they have the ability to take this money and do whatever they want with it in a way that does not follow constitutional transfer mechanisms because placing it under the control of Donald wouldn't follow any of those narrow DOJ rules that allow them to create things. And it would involve notification of lawful authority. Basically, they are saying that, yes, we don't have to prove that this is legal, we're just going to do it anyway. Your definition means that this micro-coup is a legally defined thing.

G: You’re making a definitional argument, and within your framework it is consistent.

The only distinction I’m drawing is between:

a philosophical/political classification, and
the narrower categories typically used in constitutional litigation or criminal law.

If an executive-linked arrangement truly claimed:

unilateral control,
immunity from oversight,
immunity from judicial review,
immunity from congressional inquiry,
and authority unsupported by statute or constitutional delegation,

then yes, critics could reasonably characterize it as an authoritarian assertion of power rather than ordinary constitutional governance.

Where lawyers and courts would still likely resist the “coup” label is that the American legal system tends to reserve that term for broader attempts to seize or retain governing authority itself, rather than for individual unconstitutional mechanisms or structures. Instead, they would probably attack it through doctrines like:

ultra vires executive action,
violation of the Appropriations Clause,
improper delegation,
records-law violations,
due process concerns,
separation-of-powers violations,
or abuse of prosecutorial authority.

So the disagreement is less about the underlying concern and more about taxonomy. Your position is essentially: “Any successful creation of an unreviewable governmental enclave is coup-like by nature, even if small-scale.”

That is a coherent political theory statement, even if it is not standard legal terminology.

M: Don't put this on me. You made the definition, or you brought it up. I pointed out that everything I have said has fallen within the definition. It's not a philosophical or political classification. I just pointed out in literal form how this applies in the definition you provided. The resistance of the word coup is because of the power behind it, which is why I'm calling it a microcoup in order to distinguish, but the problem is that there is no alternative word available that doesn't lessen the impact. Like, this isn't resistance because it's not just resistance. It is simply claiming a power that belongs to the government. Any words with violence, of course, don't apply. There is no linguistic representation for this kind of termite gnawing of a little space that could get larger if allowed to remain in the form of a microcoup.

G: Fair correction. You were applying the criteria I laid out, not inventing a new standard after the fact.

And your “termite gnawing” metaphor gets at the linguistic gap you’re frustrated by: most English political vocabulary is built around either:

overt ruptures (coup, insurrection, dictatorship), or
ordinary institutional conflict (corruption, overreach, abuse of power).

There are fewer commonly used terms for: “small but precedent-setting assertions of unreviewable authority that remain inside the shell of constitutional structure while hollowing out accountability mechanisms.”

That’s why political scientists and constitutional scholars often resort to phrases like:

democratic erosion,
constitutional hardball,
executive aggrandizement,
authoritarian creep,
competitive authoritarianism,
illiberalism,
autocratization,
constitutional rot.

But those terms tend to sound clinical or gradualist, while your objection is specifically that the asserted principle itself is categorical: “we may create a sphere beyond ordinary constitutional accountability because we say so.”

That is why “microcoup” feels rhetorically closer to what you mean, even if it is not a standard legal term.

M: Yeah, all of the words that you offered are not definite enough. They imply something that could happen or some sort of gradient. And this is not a gradient. We've already gone through all of the things like erosion and hardball and all of that stuff, and now we're at the point of microcoo.

G: I see the distinction you’re drawing.

“Erosion” implies passive wear. “Hardball” implies aggressive but still mutually recognized rules. “Creep” implies ambiguity. “Rot” implies decay.

Your objection is that this is not accidental decay or strategic brinksmanship, but an affirmative assertion: “We possess a zone of authority that normal constitutional accountability mechanisms cannot touch.”

That is qualitatively different from mere norm-breaking in your framework. You’re describing a claimed exemption from the constitutional feedback loop itself, not simply rough use of it.

So your use of “microcoup” is functioning as: “a localized assertion of sovereign-style immunity inside a constitutional system.”

That is more precise than the softer institutional language, even if it remains outside standard legal vocabulary.

M: Yeah, like you can talk about the rot at the basis of a structure, but when a bit snaps off and, you know, buries three people, you don't call it rot, you call it a collapse. This is not erosion. This is what happens when erosion goes on long enough. It's a micro-coup. I mean, seriously, if you can come up with an existent word that actually can point at specifically a moment and call it something else that's definite rather than an ongoing anticipation of disaster, then please tell me. I don't want to be making up words if I'm trying to make an argument.

G: Honestly, “usurpation” is probably the closest existing formal word to what you mean.

Not in the monarchy sense people usually imagine, but in the literal definition: the unlawful seizure or exercise of power.

The problem is that “usurpation” is broad and bloodless-sounding in modern English, so it lacks the immediacy you’re reaching for. But conceptually it is closer than “erosion” or “hardball” because it refers to a discrete act, not a gradual process.

Other possibilities, though each misses something:

constitutional breach — too passive/legalistic.
constitutional rupture — stronger, but usually implies larger systemic breakage.
executive usurpation — probably the closest conventional phrase.
nullification of oversight — precise but narrow.
authoritarian seizure of authority — accurate but clunky.
extraconstitutional assertion of power — academically precise, rhetorically weak.

Your frustration is basically that English lacks a widely accepted term for: “a discrete, nonviolent attempt to carve out sovereign-like authority immune from normal constitutional constraint while still formally inside the state.”

That gap is real. Which is why you keep gravitating back toward “microcoup”: it communicates discreteness, illegitimacy, and constitutional fracture all at once.

M: Yeah, anything that is in the list you gave is either, like you said, a little bit bloodless and or expansive in terms of what it's supposed to be talking about, like a usurpation implies that you took the entirety of something instead of just a minor undermining, or are so demonstrative and explosive in their usual usage that it cannot be used without making it sound like a catastrophe that should be obvious. It's a catastrophe, but again, it's a catastrophe in the darkness. A rupture sounds to the average person who hears it as though it's something that would explode in their face or whose consequences would explode in their face. This is a snap that can go unnoticed, but nevertheless implies that a hemorrhage or other problem is about to occur.

G: That distinction is actually useful rhetorically.

You’re trying to describe:

a discrete constitutional injury,
that is real immediately,
but whose consequences are delayed, obscured, or normalized,
and which therefore fails to trigger the public’s instinctive “emergency” response.

That is why terms like “rupture” and “constitutional crisis” feel mismatched to you. They imply visible chaos. You’re describing something more like: a hidden structural failure, where the danger is not the sound of the snap itself, but the precedent created by allowing the snap to remain load-bearing.

“Microcoup” works for you because it preserves:

the definiteness of an actual event,
the illegitimacy of the assertion,
and the scale distinction from tanks-in-the-streets imagery.

In other words, you are not using it to mean: “the government has fully fallen,”

but: “an extraconstitutional pocket of authority has been asserted and normalized.”

That is a much narrower and more technically framed use than the ordinary emotional usage of “coup.”

M: [Non-text content: image_asset_pointer; content_type=image_asset_pointer; size_bytes=214124]

OCR this, please. Just the comment.

G: The crazy bigger bit about the order: he just tried to sign an order that gives himself more power. That’s exactly like trying to sue himself.

Thing is, ‘executive orders’ only count in the executive branch - they don’t get to contradict or override law.

And if he ‘orders’ someone to do something illegal? It’s still illegal.