M: How many known assassination attempts were there on Barack Obama? Please go online to find out. Then check on Joe Biden too.

G: Here’s the cleanest way to answer this: there is no single official “count” of assassination attempts for modern presidents, because most incidents are plots, threats, or disrupted attempts, not direct attacks. So the best you can do is count known, documented plots/attempts.


entity["people","Barack Obama","44th US President"]

Bottom line:

What the record actually shows

A compiled list of presidential plots includes at least 13 separate incidents targeting Obama between 2008–2023. citeturn0search10

Examples (not exhaustive):

Important nuance:

Interpretation:


entity["people","Joe Biden","46th US President"]

Bottom line:

Known incidents

From compiled records and reporting:

Interpretation:


Direct comparison (grounded, not inflated)

President Approx. documented plots/attempts Notes
Obama ~13+ High number of plots; very few got close
Biden ~3–4 Fewer documented cases so far
Both Many more threats Most never progress into actionable plots

What matters (and what doesn’t)

So if your mental model is “how many times did someone almost kill them,” the answer is:


Third angle (worth noting)

The Secret Service treats credible threats and plots almost the same operationally, which means:


If you want, I can narrow it further to only “physically executed attempts” (people actually showing up with weapons), which gives a much smaller—and more comparable—number.

M: Okay, for context, a conversation led to the thought, or rather the query of, Donald has had like three or four major assassination attempts, except that's not the entire set of information that would be necessary for that to be any kind of notable situation. What the conversation led to was the question of whether or not this was a higher count than you would expect, indicating some sort of distinct degree of unpopularity to the point of making some sort of crappy decision like that, or if it's just that Donald always finds some way to yell about how a lone nutcase is somehow tied in to whatever he's been complaining about at the moment. Because my suspicion is that there is no indication that there have been a significant number or a significantly higher number of attempts on Donald, just that he is so loud about it, while in the past it has been thought of as almost a, not an embarrassment, but something that you don't advertise in case it, you know, is the... that one extra bit that makes someone else think, hey, yeah, that's right, I wanted to try that too.

G: Your instinct is basically right: the raw number by itself doesn’t mean much, and it’s very easy to misread it without context.

Let’s ground it first.


What’s actually known for entity["politician","Donald Trump","45th U.S. President"]

There have been a few high-profile, widely reported incidents:

That lands you roughly in the “3–4 notable incidents” range, depending on how strict you are about what counts as an “attempt.”


Compare that to others

entity["politician","Barack Obama","44th U.S. President"]

entity["politician","Joe Biden","46th U.S. President"]


So is Trump’s number “high”?

Not really.

So purely on numbers:

There is no clear signal that Trump has faced an unusually high number of attempts.


Why it feels different

This is where your second hypothesis matters more than the numbers.

1. Visibility and amplification

Trump tends to:

Historically, presidents:

So you’re comparing:

That alone skews perception.


2. Media environment shift

So modern attempts feel:


3. Definition creep

People casually lump together:

into “assassination attempts,” even though those are very different tiers of seriousness.


What actually correlates with attempts

If you’re trying to read meaning into it, the real drivers are:

Not:


Third angle (the one people miss)

There’s a copycat / contagion effect around high-profile violence.

Which means:

This is why institutions traditionally kept it quiet.


Bottom line

What’s different isn’t the frequency—it’s the volume and framing of the narrative around it.

M: See, just from your start, that's my point. The reason it's high profile is partly because it keeps happening right in front of cameras, but also because afterwards, he amplifies it into the high profile level thing. I mean, people actually took shots at the White House and everyone has forgotten it, including me. Someone rammed a truck at the White House and everyone has forgotten because there was no attempt to stick it into the public consciousness as some sort of incident that could be used for leverage. Stupid leverage on occasion, such as saying that because somewhere else was vulnerable, therefore people should pay twice as much as the original estimate that was supposed to be a private donation in order to build a place that Donald can spend the next couple years, which won't even fucking happen in that amount of time. And make sure you check online for your information, because some of that stuff does not sound like you've got a citation for it.

G: You’re not off base—and the concrete example you brought up actually proves your point more than it undermines it.


The White House truck incident (what it actually was)

In May 2023, a man deliberately rammed a rented truck into White House security barriers. citeturn0search1

So objectively:

This does qualify as a real plot with violent intent, not just random noise.

And yet…

You’re right:

Most people barely remember it.


Why that fades while others don’t

1. Distance from actual harm

Compare two categories:

The truck incident never crossed from intent → proximity.
That alone dramatically lowers its staying power.

Same pattern with older incidents:

Because:


2. Narrative handling (this is your core point)

You’re right that there’s a difference in how these get used.

Historically:

With entity["politician","Donald Trump","45th U.S. President"]:

That doesn’t mean they’re fake.
It means:

They’re kept alive in public memory instead of allowed to decay.


3. Media mechanics (not just personality)

Even without Trump:

The 2024 rally shooting attempt:

That automatically:

locks it into collective memory in a way a perimeter crash never will


4. What counts as “an attempt” (this is where people go wrong)

You’re noticing a real distortion:

People casually equate:

as if they’re all the same thing.

They’re not.

A cleaner hierarchy looks like:

  1. Direct lethal attempt in proximity (rarest, most memorable)
  2. Planned attack interrupted late
  3. Plot stopped early / incoherent plan
  4. Threats / statements

Most incidents—including the truck crash—sit in #2 or #3, not #1.


So your underlying question:

“Does the number indicate unusual unpopularity or something unique?”

No.

What the evidence actually supports is:


The uncomfortable but accurate conclusion

So the signal you’re picking up isn’t:

“more attempts”

It’s:

different treatment of the same underlying phenomenon

M: What would you call... Something... Okay, I'm trying to find a terminology here. What would you call it when something is not organized enough to be a conspiracy, but seems to be within a group at least, just kind of the way that everyone thinks to the point that from the outside, it looks like there's some sort of collusion involved, when really it's just everyone seeming to follow more or less the same thought process. I'm trying to think of a non-volatile example. Okay, this isn't a perfect one, but say hypothetically, that someone who doesn't know anything about America, watched... Including the name of the... That someone who didn't know anything about America, including the name of the restaurant they were at, was at a California pizza kitchen or whatever it's called, and started to realize that despite the menu having all kinds of food on it, that a disproportionate number of people were ordering pizza. With just that observation, they might suspect that there's some sort of conspiracy, when in fact, it's more of just everyone going in there thinking, I went to a place named pizza. I'm probably going to go with something pizza-related unless there's a really good reason. What would you call that situation where the conspiracy, or rather the idea that it's a conspiracy is understandable, but in truth, it's more of simply a contextual likelihood due to the population involved.

G: You’re circling a real phenomenon, and there isn’t just one term for it—there are a few overlapping ones depending on what aspect you want to emphasize. I’ll give you the cleanest fits first, then sharper variants.


Core term (closest match)

Convergent behavior

People independently arrive at the same action or conclusion because they’re operating under the same incentives, information, or context.

Your pizza example fits this almost perfectly.


Slightly more analytical framing

Common-cause correlation

The behavior isn’t caused by people influencing each other—it’s caused by a shared underlying factor.

This is the most precise “technical” description of what’s happening.


When it feels like a conspiracy

Illusion of coordination

From the outside, it looks like people are working together, but they’re not.

This describes the observer error, not the behavior itself.


More sociological angle

Emergent behavior

Group-level patterns arise from many individuals following simple rules or instincts.

This is the broader systems-level version of what you’re describing.


When it’s reinforced socially (optional nuance)

Social proof / norm convergence

People lean toward what seems expected or typical for that environment.

This adds a feedback loop to your scenario.


The “conspiracy-adjacent” misread

If you want a phrase specifically for:

“It looks coordinated enough that a conspiracy explanation feels plausible”

You’re basically describing:

Spontaneous order mistaken for collusion

That’s not a formal textbook term, but it’s a very accurate plain-language label.


Tight summary

What you’re describing is:

Independent decisions converging due to shared context, producing a pattern that resembles coordination.


Third angle (worth flagging)

There’s a spectrum here:

People often collapse all three into “conspiracy,” which is why this confusion happens so easily.


If you want a single phrase that carries most of what you’re aiming at without sounding academic:

“Convergent behavior driven by shared context.”

M: Okay, yeah, thank you. Just the description convergent behavior was enough to start settling it down. Like taking it away from the violent stuff but keeping it political. It's like how Donald's administration keeps being stupid about how it talks about protests and things like that, because they keep calling it some form of, like, conspiracy and using that terminology. When really, it's not people... It's not conspiring. It's multiple people independently going through the same thought process of, God, this sucks, what can I do? I need to show it. Hey, look, we can go here. Terminology really helps with how you think about things, or it can fuck it up if it's the wrong words. It's like if everyone in a relatively small town was in the mood to go out and enjoy the weather and some live music. That's not the same thing as saying there is a conspiracy to support a music festival.

G: You’ve landed on the right frame, and the terminology shift you made is doing real work.

What you’re describing is exactly the difference between:

  • coordination (people planning together), and
  • convergence (people arriving at the same action independently)

When those get blurred, interpretation goes off the rails.


Why “convergent behavior” fits protests well

In many protest situations, what you actually have is:

  • a shared trigger (“this sucks”)
  • a limited set of visible responses (march, gather, chant, post)
  • a known focal point (a city square, a building, a date)

That naturally produces:

lots of people doing the same thing at the same time
without needing a central organizer.

That’s classic convergence, not conspiracy.


The missing piece: focal points

There’s a useful concept that sharpens this further:

Focal points (Schelling points)

These are obvious “default” choices people gravitate toward without coordination.

Examples:

  • “Meet at the big plaza”
  • “Show up at noon”
  • “Go where others are already gathering”

So even without talking to each other, people cluster in the same place, which from the outside can look organized.


Why it gets framed as conspiracy anyway

There are a few reasons this keeps happening:

1. Pattern → intent shortcut

Humans see:

synchronized behavior
and instinctively infer: someone must be directing it

That’s a cognitive bias, not evidence.


2. Language as leverage

Calling something a “conspiracy” or “organized effort”:

  • implies deliberate control
  • assigns blame to a specific actor
  • makes the situation feel more containable or attackable

Whereas “a lot of people independently reacting” is:

  • harder to target
  • harder to simplify

3. Real overlap exists

This part matters:

  • Some protests do have organizers
  • Some messaging does spread intentionally

So you often get a hybrid:

a small amount of coordination sitting on top of a much larger layer of convergence

People then misattribute the whole thing to the smaller, visible organized part.


Your town music example is actually perfect

“People want music + good weather → they show up”

That creates:

  • crowd
  • energy
  • reinforcement

From the outside, it can look like:

“someone must have planned this turnout”

But really it’s:

shared conditions + predictable human response


Clean distinction (useful shorthand)

If you want a quick mental filter:

  • Conspiracy: requires communication and planning
  • Convergence: only requires shared conditions and similar incentives

Most real-world mass behavior sits much closer to the second than people think.


Third angle (where it does get tricky)

Even without coordination, convergence can still:

  • scale quickly
  • feel overwhelming
  • produce real-world impact

So people aren’t wrong to treat it as significant—
they’re just often wrong about why it’s happening.


Bottom line

You’re basically correcting a category error:

Mistaking independent alignment under shared conditions
for
intentional coordination

And yeah—once you’ve got the right term, the whole thing stops looking mysterious and starts looking… predictable.

M: Okay, now, what would it be called if you were halfway between the conspiracy-level thing and that convergent behavior idea? Like, if there are a couple people with a definite end goal and plan, but it relies in execution more on that convergent thinking or the attitude of a certain population and being able to read with high degree of accuracy what they are likely to do in a certain situation, whether it's reacting to your plan or, depending on the situation, perhaps even getting involved with it without actually being part of the plan.

G: You’re describing a real middle zone, and there are a few terms that map onto it. None are perfect alone, but together they triangulate it cleanly.


Closest practical label

Orchestrated convergence

A small group sets conditions or a trigger, then relies on predictable crowd behavior to do most of the work.

  • There is intent and planning
  • But not full control
  • The outcome depends on how people are expected to react

This is basically your idea in one phrase.


More established concepts (different angles)

Catalyzed emergence

A planned spark that produces a largely unplanned but predictable spread.

  • Think: someone lights the match
  • The fire spreads based on existing conditions

Emphasizes: trigger + environment


Agenda-setting (or narrative seeding)

A smaller group shapes what people are thinking about, not what they explicitly do.

  • “Here’s the issue” → people independently react
  • Relies on shared psychology and incentives

Emphasizes: influence without direct coordination


Strategic framing

Define a situation in a way that nudges people toward a predictable response.

  • You don’t tell them what to do
  • You make certain actions feel obvious or justified

Emphasizes: guiding interpretation


Astroturfing (only sometimes)

This is the manipulative version:

  • A coordinated effort designed to look like spontaneous grassroots behavior
  • Can overlap with your scenario, but implies deception

Not always applicable, but sits in the same space.


Clean mental model (use this)

Think of three levels:

  1. Pure convergence

    • No planner
    • Just shared conditions
  2. Catalyzed / orchestrated convergenceyour case

    • Small group sets things in motion
    • Crowd behavior does the scaling
  3. Full coordination (conspiracy)

    • Direct planning and control throughout

Why this middle zone works

It leverages something simple:

Human behavior is predictable enough that you don’t need full control to get a desired outcome.

So instead of coordinating everyone, you:

  • pick the right moment
  • introduce the right trigger
  • let people’s existing tendencies carry it forward

Third angle (important distinction)

There are two versions of this middle zone:

Passive version

  • “If we do X, people will probably react like Y”

Active version

  • “We will engineer X specifically to get Y”

Both look similar from the outside, but the second is more deliberate and closer to manipulation.


Bottom line

The most direct way to say what you mean:

A small amount of planning that relies on large-scale predictable human reactions to achieve its effect.

If you want a short label that captures it well:

Orchestrated convergence or catalyzed emergence.

M: Okay, let's use a hypothetical, not something that I believe is necessarily happening, but probably has been used once or twice. Sorry, I'm rambling there. So, what would you call like an FBI or CIA kind of thing where there might be one or two main people who know the entirety of what's going on, who then use either their position or vagueness or something vague that sounds specific in order to incorporate other people in a way that, you know, would be conspiratorial if they knew the entire state of the thing, but which knowing only what they do seems legal and legitimate, if kind of, you know, arguable in terms of whether it should be done or not by the American people. Like, for example, and this one is purely hypothetical, like if, for example, you could show that three people definitely, I don't know, started Vietnam in a desire to take over drug operations there while convincing everyone else that it was for the good of the American people or something, even if the American people didn't agree.

G: You’re now describing something more intentional and hierarchical than the earlier “convergent behavior” idea. There are established ways to name this pattern, depending on which aspect you want to emphasize.


Cleanest core concept

Compartmentalization (need-to-know structure)

A small number of people understand the full plan, while everyone else:

  • gets only partial information
  • performs actions that look legitimate in isolation

This is standard in intelligence/military contexts.
It’s not inherently illegal—it’s how sensitive operations are often structured.


When it’s used to guide behavior indirectly

Plausible deniability

Higher-level actors:

  • avoid giving explicit, traceable orders
  • rely on implication, framing, or selective information

So subordinates act in ways that:

  • align with the hidden goal
  • but don’t clearly implicate the top-level planner

When actions are shaped through framing

Pretextual framing

People are given a stated reason that is:

  • incomplete or misleading
  • but still coherent enough to justify action

They’re not necessarily “in on it”—they’re operating under a constructed narrative.


When participation is distributed without full awareness

Distributed agency under asymmetric information

  • Many actors contribute
  • No single lower-level participant sees the whole
  • The system produces an outcome that looks coordinated

This is the more analytical way to describe what you’re getting at.


The more loaded / critical terms (use carefully)

Associated with entity["people","Noam Chomsky","linguist and political analyst"]

  • Public or institutional support is shaped through selective information and framing

Limited hangout

  • Partial truths are revealed to manage perception
  • Keeps people engaged with a version of reality that omits the core issue

Shadow coordination

(Not a strict textbook term, but useful shorthand)

  • Real coordination exists
  • but is intentionally obscured behind normal-looking processes

Your hypothetical (Vietnam-style example)

What you described would be framed as:

  • Compartmentalized planning (few know the real motive)
  • Pretextual justification (others act under a different stated reason)
  • Plausible deniability (top-level intent is insulated)

That combination is what creates:

participation that feels legitimate locally but contributes to something different globally


Important grounding distinction

There’s a spectrum:

  1. Legitimate compartmentalization
    • Used for security or efficiency
  2. Strategic framing
    • Selective but not necessarily deceptive
  3. Manipulative pretext + deniability
    • Moves toward what people call “conspiratorial”

Your example sits toward #3.


Bottom line

The tightest way to describe your scenario:

A compartmentalized operation using pretext and plausible deniability to guide partially informed participants toward a concealed objective.

That captures the structure without jumping straight to “conspiracy,” while still acknowledging intentional design.