M: Go online, find critiques of Joe Biden's approach to handling Israel from 2020 through 2024, and use that to build a editorial composed almost entirely of right-wing quotes with citations, explaining why Donald Trump, despite those same right-wing people trying to defend him now, could easily use leverage against Israel to keep them from continuing the current Iran war.
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M: I apologize, I should have extended on things before I sent that first message. The purpose of this article is as much to critique the hypocrisy or complete reversal of position that these people have had in terms of support and also to point out the failure to hold parallel standards that has occurred since Donald came into control and they decided that rather than sticking with the original principle of the United States having the capacity to discourage Israel from listening to its darker impulses, they instead have opted simply to kowtow to the toddler Donald and his impulsive desire to go after Iran and blow things up for reasons that change on a daily or almost mid-paragraph basis.
G: TL;DR
Right-wing critics spent 2020–2024 arguing that Biden had too
much leverage over Israel and was misusing it—“undermining,”
“micromanaging,” or being “weak.” Those same arguments implicitly
concede the core point: the U.S. can pressure Israel when it
chooses to. The reversal now is not about capability—it’s about
willingness.
For four years, the critique from the American right was not subtle. It was loud, repetitive, and—crucially—internally consistent:
Biden is weak on Iran.
Biden is restraining Israel.
Biden is interfering too much.
Biden is undermining an ally.
Take them at their word.
Because if those claims were true, then one conclusion follows cleanly:
The United States has leverage over Israel—and can use it.
The right’s argument against Biden rested on two parallel claims:
Republicans repeatedly argued Biden’s policies emboldened Tehran:
Even outside U.S. politics, similar framing appeared:
Translation:
They believed U.S. policy meaningfully shapes regional
behavior—including Israel’s security environment.
At the same time, they accused Biden of restraining Israel directly:
Even rhetorical pressure was treated as consequential:
Translation:
They believed U.S. funding, weapons, and diplomatic posture directly
influence Israeli decisions.
They also attacked Biden for inconsistency:
And even bipartisan critics noted:
Translation:
The critique wasn’t that leverage didn’t exist—it was that Biden
wasn’t using it effectively or coherently.
Put those arguments together:
That is not an argument about limits.
That is an argument about control mechanisms.
Which leads to the uncomfortable conclusion:
If Biden could “undermine,” “micromanage,” or “weaken” Israel—
then a president willing to apply pressure more aggressively could do far more.
Now compare that framework to current defenses of Trump-aligned policy:
The same voices that once argued:
“Biden is restraining Israel too much”
are now effectively arguing:
“The U.S. cannot restrain Israel at all”
That is not a refinement.
That is a reversal.
Even Biden—often criticized as reluctant—demonstrated the mechanism:
And those moves triggered immediate backlash from the right.
Why?
Because they understood what those actions represented:
Leverage being exercised.
The right-wing critique of Biden accidentally proves the central point:
Then it can also:
The difference is not capability.
The difference is intent.
There is a partial truth here:
But this does not negate leverage—it only limits it.
Even critics admitted that U.S. actions:
So the realistic position is:
The U.S. cannot dictate—but it can constrain, incentivize, and delay.
Which is exactly what the earlier critiques assumed.
They already made the case.
They argued—repeatedly—that the United States can shape Israel’s behavior through pressure, aid, and deterrence.
Now they argue the opposite.
Not because the facts changed.
Because the presidency did.
M: Just so you know my position, it's that Biden didn't do nearly enough in order to hold back Netanyahu. I think that a lot of rhetoric is falsely equivocating the government and particularly Netanyahu with the entirety of Israel, and Netanyahu has encouraged this the same way that Donald seems to think of himself as being the entirety of America. Netanyahu has no problem with himself being thought of as being equivalent to Israel itself, and I don't believe Biden did nearly enough to discourage this or otherwise restrain Netanyahu's impulses. This isn't coming out of nowhere, either. I mean, recently Netanyahu said he's been trying to do this attack for like 40 years. So when I say that Biden didn't restrain Netanyahu nearly enough or even push back against the attempt to equate Netanyahu's government with the entirety of Israel, it's not out of nowhere, and I agree with it. That's one of the reasons why this pisses me off so much is because it was already awkward to know that I was at the time on the same side as people who were in agreement with me in terms of what should be done, but for less savory reasons. Now those same people have just basically stuck their nose up Donald's ass and are acting as though everything they said before means nothing because he somehow believes that the past means nothing.
G: TL;DR
You’re not contradicting yourself—you’re pointing at a real
fracture.
The earlier right-wing critique (“Biden isn’t restraining Israel enough
/ is handling leverage badly”) implicitly agreed with you on
capability, but diverged on motive. The current shift isn’t a
refinement—it’s a collapse of standards once the actor
changed.
Your position:
Biden had leverage and didn’t use it enough to restrain Netanyahu.
Their earlier position (stripped of rhetoric):
Biden had leverage and was using it badly—either too weakly or in the wrong direction.
Those are not opposites.
They share a common premise:
Where you split:
That’s a disagreement over application, not existence.
What you’re describing is structurally important, not rhetorical fluff.
Netanyahu’s political survival strategy has long leaned on fusion:
That mirrors something you already pointed out with Trump:
Once that fusion is accepted, two things happen:
Your frustration with Biden is basically:
He never decisively broke that fusion.
Which is fair criticism. He often:
That ambiguity reinforced the fusion instead of dismantling it.
The reversal you’re reacting to isn’t subtle. It’s a structural flip:
→ Translation:
U.S. pressure on Israel is real and consequential
→ Translation:
U.S. pressure is either illegitimate or shouldn’t be
used
That’s not a change in facts.
It’s a shift in permissible use of power depending on who holds it.
If you strip it down cleanly, your argument becomes:
That’s internally consistent.
And importantly:
You’re not saying Biden was “anti-Israel.”
You’re saying he failed to differentiate Israel from its
leadership strongly enough to constrain that leadership.
That’s a much sharper claim.
There’s one place your framing can overreach:
“Biden could have restrained Netanyahu significantly more”
Probably true—but not unlimited.
Constraints you may be underweighting:
So the realistic version isn’t:
“He could control Netanyahu”
It’s:
“He could have raised the cost of escalation enough to alter timing, scope, or political viability”
That’s still meaningful—but it’s not absolute control.
This is the uncomfortable middle:
Meaning:
The debate isn’t whether leverage exists
It’s how aggressively and toward what outcome it’s applied
That keeps your criticism intact without requiring the system to be fully controllable.
Your frustration isn’t about disagreement.
It’s about watching people:
The inconsistency isn’t in your position.
It’s in theirs.