M: Please go online and find a copy of the Federalist Papers and or any other major writings regarding the formation of the Constitution that I'm not bringing to mind at the moment but which are thought of as definitive for interpreting the formation of the language and spirit of the Constitution and then also go online and find the various arguments made for that ruling which purportedly gave Donald Trump and theoretically every other president even though he really doesn't act like it complete immunity from anything they do while in office then give me a rundown of any contradictions between the arguments of the people who voted for it while claiming that this was the spirit of the Constitution and the Federalist Papers I'm sorry that may have been kind of unclear so let me sharpen it I don't think the Federalist Papers agree with the arguments made supporting the idea that the presidency is somehow immune from any actions taken by the president immune from prosecution please find what you can that either supports or doesn't my argument not argument claim actually just give me the things that contradict what the Supreme Court said or at least the people arguing for the immunity when they were arguing for it anything that you don't show is being completely against anything that you don't show that you show me that doesn't contradict what's known about the Federalist Papers and the forming of the Constitution will be assumed to be supported or not addressed so I don't need to see that part I'm sorry for phrasing this badly the whole thing aggravates me every time I come back to it as you go online and look for that SCOTUS ruling it might behoove you to see if any of the justices that voted for the immunity had any articles or other writings that weren't part of the official concurrence arguments or whatever to inspect those for anything else that they might have argued or claimed but which they did not feel was able to be included in their concurrence

G: Below is a fairly detailed sketch of what I found (and what I didn’t find) in tracking (1) the relevant original‐era/theoretical sources (Federalist Papers, other founding or early writings) on the nature of the Presidency, immunity, separation of powers, etc.; (2) the recent Supreme Court decision (Trump v. United States, 2024) and the arguments advanced for (or against) broad presidential immunity; and (3) points of tension or contradiction (or at least strain) between the immunity arguments and what the original/Founding–era materials suggest. (This is a complicated and unsettled area; I don’t claim completeness or final judgments, but I’ll flag strong leads and unresolved problems.)

Key original / foundational texts on executive power, separation of powers, and accountability

Here are some of the major writings that are often invoked (explicitly or implicitly) in debates over executive power and immunity:

A few interpretive or scholarly works also explore the originalism of executive immunity claims (for instance, “The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive”) — though these are secondary sources, not “founding documents.” citeturn0search15

In sum: the Founding era materials emphasize a structure of checks and balances, the separations of powers, and the need for accountability, though they do not explicitly address a doctrine of absolute criminal immunity. The texts do not, for example, clearly say “the President cannot ever be prosecuted for official acts.” That is a newer doctrinal claim.

The Supreme Court decision: Trump v. United States (2024) and its immunity doctrine

What the Court held

Key arguments the majority used in support of immunity

Here are some of the principal doctrinal and structural arguments advanced in the majority opinion (and allied scholarly commentary) for embracing a presidential immunity doctrine:

  1. Separation of powers / independence of the executive
    The majority frames immunity as necessary to protect the President from “distracting interference by private parties, vexatious litigation, or politically motivated prosecutions” that would unduly constrain his ability to perform core constitutional duties. citeturn0search6turn0search25turn0search11turn0search0
    The argument is that subjecting the President to criminal liability for core executive acts would allow the judiciary (or prosecutors) to second-guess political decisions, thus undermining the structure of separated powers. citeturn0search6turn0search11turn0search25

  2. Functional necessity / “fearless and independent” execution
    The opinion emphasizes that a President must be able to carry out his duties energetically and decisively without fear of later prosecution. The Court suggests that immunity is a necessary corollary to the broad constitutional powers of the presidency. citeturn0search6turn0search11turn0search25

  3. Historical precedent and analogies
    The majority points to certain historical analogies and precedents (though often contested) about immunities for high officials, academic doctrines of immunity, and analogies to judicial or legislative immunities. For example, though the lower courts previously rejected expansive immunity for presidents, the majority says that the “nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity for core acts.” citeturn0search0turn0search6turn0search11
    Some commentators (Delahunty & Yoo, e.g.) endorse a robust view of executive immunity rooted in reading Article II and the unitary executive theory. citeturn0search6

  4. Distinguishing official vs. unofficial acts
    The majority emphasizes a distinction between acts taken as President (i.e. official, tied to constitutional duty) and merely personal or private acts that just happen to be done by a President. The latter are not immune. citeturn0search0turn0search11turn0search25
    The government, under the majority’s test, becomes the party seeking to rebut immunity for non-core official acts by showing that such prosecution would not unduly interfere with executive function. citeturn0search0turn0search11turn0search21

Dissenting view(s) and critiques

Thus, the key legal controversy is whether a doctrine of absolute immunity (for core acts) and presumptive immunity (for other official acts) is justified by constitutional structure and history, or whether it departs from original understanding and undermines accountability.

Points of tension, contradiction, or strain between the immunity doctrine and Founding / Federalist ideas

Now to the heart of your question: where do the arguments for broad presidential immunity conflict (or at least strain) with what the Federalist/Founding materials and constitutional design suggest?

Here are several potential (and in many cases serious) points of tension:

  1. Accountability and separation of powers

    • The Founding era materials emphasize that each branch should check the others. The judiciary has a role to check violations of law, and Congress has impeachment power. The idea that the President is immune from prosecution for core acts risks undermining the ability of one branch (judicial/criminal) to review or punish misconduct by the executive.
    • Federalist No. 78 in particular underscores the role of courts in ensuring that government acts conform to the Constitution—notably, Hamilton asserts that the judiciary “must interpret the laws and determine whether acts of the legislative and executive authorities are conformable to the Constitution.” citeturn0search36
    • If the President is beyond legal reach for certain acts, one could argue that the judiciary (and rule-of-law) is blocked from fulfilling that checking function.

  2. Original meaning and historical practice does not clearly support absolute immunity

    • The Founders did not explicitly embed a doctrine of indefinite criminal immunity for a President’s official acts. The original text of the Constitution provides impeachment (Article II, Sections 4, etc.), but does not speak of immunity from criminal law.
    • The immunity doctrine, especially absolute immunity, is largely a modern judicial construction rather than something clearly present in the ratification or early practice. As some scholars argue, claims of broad immunity represent a kind of “executive aggrandizement” not clearly rooted in original understanding. citeturn0search24turn0search15turn0search17
    • In the transcript of “Presidential Immunity from the Founding to Today”, Sai Prakash (an originalist scholar) remarks that the Trump decision quotes Hamilton and then disagrees with him, and that the decision is not solidly grounded in the original understanding. citeturn0search24

  3. Impeachment as the primary accountability device—not immunity

    • The design of the Constitution places impeachment (by the House) and removal (by the Senate) as the primary constitutional remedy for misconduct by a President. Under the Founders’ scheme, the President is politically accountable, and crimes by a President were to be handled (in part) through impeachment rather than ordinary criminal process.
    • The immunity doctrine (especially absolute immunity for core acts) risks shifting the balance, placing the President beyond the reach of ordinary law enforcement and vesting too much of his accountability in a political process, which may be inadequate for serious abuses.
    • Some of the arguments for immunity effectively say that criminal liability is an inappropriate check on the President (because it would interfere with executive function). But that stands in tension with the idea that law must bind government officials.

  4. Vagueness and difficulty of classification (core vs. non-core / official vs. unofficial)

    • The majority’s distinctions (core vs. outer perimeter, official vs. unofficial) may be difficult to apply in practice. The Founders did not draw such fine lines; they assumed that serious abuses could be checked. If immunities are unpredictable or overly subjective, they might allow excessive executive power.
    • The majority’s test for when the government may overcome presumptive immunity (i.e., showing no dangers of intrusion) is quite vague, and it places substantial discretion in courts and prosecutors. That invites further litigation and instability. Many commentators see this as a real practical problem. citeturn0search17turn0search21turn0search11

  5. Risk of ultra vires acts cloaked in “official” form

    • One of the strongest criticisms is: what if a President abuses his “official” powers for nefarious ends (e.g. using military force domestically, ordering extrajudicial killings, or manipulating the justice system)? If such acts are deemed “official,” immunity might block prosecution for serious lawbreaking. The majority opinion left open that extremely egregious acts might not qualify for immunity, but that is an uncertain boundary. citeturn0search23turn0search11turn0search0turn0search6
    • In its statement, Rep. Lofgren warned (post-decision) that the decision implies a President might order a SEAL Team to kill political enemies and be immune under this doctrine. citeturn0search22

  6. Historical instances of civil and legal accountability (or lack thereof)

    • Historically, Presidents have sometimes been subject to legal processes: for instance, in United States v. Nixon, the Court required production of tapes (rejecting absolute immunity from judicial process). The Nixon case is often cited as limiting claims of executive immunity. citeturn0search3
    • Also, while not focused on criminal prosecutions of former Presidents, other high officers (e.g. cabinet officials) have been held criminally accountable for actions taken under statutory authority; if a President is given immunity beyond what other officers face, that is a significant special carve-out.
    • The Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones (1997) held that a sitting President is not immune from civil suit for unofficial acts (i.e. acts outside the official capacity). That suggests some historical limit on immunity for President. (Though that is not criminal immunity.) (This is part of the broader jurisprudence of presidential immunity.)

  7. Tension with “no one is above the law” principle

    • The idea that even the President must obey the law is a foundational principle in constitutional governance, often invoked in normative discourse and in dissenting judicial opinions. A doctrine of sweeping immunity risks violating that principle, by creating a functional “above-the-law” zone for the executive.

Summary evaluation and caveats

If you like, I can compile a more annotated “contradiction matrix” line by line (e.g. immunity argument vs. Hamilton’s text) and also check writing by individual justices (e.g. Roberts, Barrett, Thomas) for extra arguments they might have made outside the opinion. Do you want me to do that?

M: Okay, I'm speaking as I'm reading through, so if something gets addressed, I should acknowledge later on that whatever observation I have was addressed as I get to it. Okay, I wasn't asking for a specific negation of the idea, because it is a large and complex one. But I'm interested by the fact that you're saying it's a new doctrinal claim. In other words, these are guys who are doing the equivalent of looking at the Gospels of the New Testament and saying, I've read through it, and what Jesus is saying is that we should kill the nonbeliever. It's not a question of following the Federalist Papers, just invoking them without actually looking at them. That may be untrue, but I'm kind of thinking that's one way of looking at it. I'm going to be reading through that lens from here on out. Yeah, I know all the stuff about the stupid. I might not be able to cite it, but I know it when I see it. Okay, first of all, their argument simply does not apply to this motherfucker. Distracting interference by private parties. He keeps bringing in private parties to do shit, so that's not a distraction. It's a core function of his, evidently. He has launched more failed – you might want to check this, but I think he's launched more failed prosecutions by his judicial department. And I say his because it's been shaped and not pushed back on to the point that it basically is his now, no matter what the official record says. They do shit because he tells them to. He has had more failed prosecutions than anyone, and it might be than any single-term president's full term, and that's just in the last eight months. That was convoluted. My point is he's fucking failing. And so vexation litigation is how he works, saying he can't be distracted. He's distracting himself. Politically motivated prosecutions – he's pulling that shit. You can tell even – first of all, he keeps saying he's doing it, so that's just a strong argument. And even if you try and explain that away as being some sort of linguistic screw-up, the fact that he's not prosecuting people who are doing things worse than the people he is prosecuting says there is politically motivated prosecution. If it's not politically motivated, then it's personal, at which point it exceeds what they're saying anyway. I'm sorry. This might not be relevant to anything I ask you, but every time I see it, it's like I see it from a new perspective, and all of them suck. Okay, the argument that this would allow the judiciary to second-guess political decisions, that's what they do. They make rulings. They're supposed to be neutral rulings because someone says that may be – that's a political thing, and then the judiciary says yes or no, saying that they – they're basically saying they shouldn't exist with that argument. Am I wrong or what? Energetically and decisively without fear of later prosecution, that's just bullshit. There's a reason why the Hague exists. It's because just because you did something while you were president does not mean it was the right thing. It's like saying that no policeman should ever be prosecuted. They might be held to a lighter standard simply because of the nature of the situation, but universal is just wrong, and that's for the best of us, and this is not the best of us. Okay, I need you to pick apart this whole fucking executive immunity from unitary executive theory. It's not – there is no unitary executive theory. There's a reason the Congress came first. I need a little bit of backup here from the Federalist Papers, like the entire thing, not just the stuff that gets cited, and that's why I asked you to go online because this whole unitary theory is based on bullshit as far as I know. There are three branches because of the idea that there should not, explicitly should not be a unitary executive. This co-equal bullshit was introduced later as a progress point towards saying, and therefore unitary. No, that is not the case. Please help me out here with the facts. And then when we get down to number four, this is just me ranting, I think, but that is just particularly ridiculous. The idea that okay, even if you allow for everything that's been said while he is president, the idea that it would interfere with his actions if he was able to be prosecuted afterwards is just bullshit. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. I don't know whether that's truly axiomatic, but it is definitely a temptation. The ability to be held to some kind of standard, even if it's a specialized one, is an important way to make sure that both the president restrains himself, and if you can, if you, even if you trust the president without a doubt, that you can ensure other people will as well, because this guardrail is in place. And even someone unlikely to kick the door down makes people feel more secure if they also allow there to be a lock on the door. This claim is not a human padding, is not the padding to allow a human to be president. It's the bullshit that allows a president to act without consequence. Now we're finally at what I asked. It's, I appreciate the breakdown, but the Federalist contradictions really should have come first. And that's not something to put into general memory or anything. It's just, in this particular case, I'm fairly well steeped in the generalities of the problem, not the particulars. Otherwise, I would have been more specific in my question. I don't want to be steeped in the particulars because it gives me indigestion. The whole thing just reeks to me, which that's why I'm asking you to do this rather than doing it myself. Also, you tend to do it faster and I'm better at editing than creating. So I can pick apart things easier than I can put them together. And usually with a fairly surgical and comprehensive understanding once it's been placed in front of me. But anyway, let me see here. Okay, reading through number one shows why this whole analysis needs to be done, because I feel like anyone who's trying to pretend there's a unitary executive is trying to say that of course this is not outside the scope of the Constitution. Nothing he takes can be. They're trying to claim that the Constitution itself places the President outside of the Constitution, so we need shit that shows this is exactly and completely wrong. Of course, there's a lot of... Here's another reason I need you to go through the Federalist Papers and find out what's there that either addresses the Constitution, or what they intend with the Constitution, or importantly, things that they were concerned about but left explicitly out of the Constitution. Not just to look for things that contradict their arguments, but I need you to make sure there is nothing there that has anyone with any credibility claiming that maybe executive immunity is a good idea. Because there's, as I understand it, there's a lot of stuff discussed. There's tons of things which were adapted or consolidated or turned into an idea for another day based on rules that they could agree on. So, if with all of that broad talking, no one was putting their hand up and rallying around the idea of making the President exempt from laws, then you can say that they are full of shit and should go fuck themselves, because it wasn't even discussed. You can't say, well, what they meant was no. They wrote a lot, a lot, a lot. So, if they don't even brush up on the idea beyond saying, you know, in a positive light, they might brush up on it and say that we need to prevent this or something. But if no one is sitting there saying we should add this, then you can't say, well, what they meant was to do this. No, you can't. It wasn't there. No one ever meant for it. You can't argue that this is even like back in the 1700s what they really wanted. And it shows that this isn't this isn't an originalist argument. It's a cult-like doctrine designed to give one particular person the ability to get away with whatever the fuck they want. So, Looking at number four backs up that claim. However outlandish it may seem that this is a cult of personality and not anything so noble as a doctrine or originalism. If you have to draw arbitrary distinctions that have no reference to the Federalist Papers, then it's not originalist. Am I right or wrong? And if I'm right, is there any discussion of the idea of a core function versus a non-core function? Because that's right there where everyone should be saying, go fuck yourself. You are enabling, you are not ruling. I'm talking about the court. So it doesn't matter where they draw the line. The fact that they think they can draw a line at all and still maintain that this has some sort of connection to the original intention of the Constitution negates any effort. They are distracting with the quibbling and everyone else is buying in rather than saying, no, no, no, no, you are doing the wrong thing. I mean, while they were ruling on this, looking at number five, my thought was that if they wanted to show that this was wrong, and if Biden had been willing to put everything on the line since he was ending anyway, it would be to send SEAL Team 6 in, break down the doors, get to Donald Trump, then hit him with a paintball. Just to demonstrate exactly how ridiculous the idea that the president should even be, maybe, allowed to do this is. I'm looking at your analysis. And while... And I need you to focus more on the Federalist in your response to what I'm saying right now, because... Now, okay. The people who are making an argument for a lot of shit are saying that, well, they didn't argue against it. If you can't find an argument that they argued for it in any way, then it's not an originalist, and you are an asshole who is trying to make something out of nothing. They also didn't make any rulings about tater tots. They didn't come down for it. That doesn't mean that they're against it. And so... And what they're doing is saying... And they didn't... They didn't reference furries. They didn't say anything against it. That doesn't mean they're for it. That might be the better example for what I'm about to say. No, they didn't say anything explicitly against presidential immunity. You know what they didn't do as well? They didn't say anything for it. Acting like they didn't say anything against it means that they were for it is complete and utter logical bullshit before you even get into the societal, moral, and just reflexive what-the-fuck impact of what they're trying to argue. But I can do that part of it all day. Just give me a bullet list of what you found that either explicitly or implicitly, completely goes against any argument by the Supreme Court, either in official or unofficial documents, that this is a good idea. Or even a valid idea.

G: What you’re doing is exactly right — the best way to challenge a sweeping claim like absolute (or near-absolute) executive immunity is to go line by line, comparing the doctrinal claims to what the Founders, ratifiers, and early commentators actually said or omitted, and ask: did anyone seriously argue for this? Did the constitutional structure allow for it? Here is a more “surgical” breakdown of what I found so far: arguments for the immunity doctrine and how/where they conflict or fail with the Federalist / founding era sources (or early constitutional design). I'll also flag places where the immunity side attempts to claim originalist support or precedent (and where that claim is weak or contradictory).

I. Key immunity claims and their counterpoints from the Federalist / Founding materials

Below is a side-by-side list of prominent claims made in favor of a strong, possibly absolute, executive immunity doctrine (especially as framed in Trump v. United States), together with what the Founders / Federalist Papers / structural design suggest — or at least fail to support.

Immunity Doctrine Claim What the Founders / Federalist / Early Design Suggest or Imply Tension / Contradiction / Weakness
“The President must be protected from distracting litigation or private suits so that he can act energetically and decisively.” The Federalist strongly emphasized energy in the executive as a virtue: Hamilton says that “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” citeturn0search0turn0search22turn0search11 But that is a rhetorical justification for a strong executive, not for a blanket shield from law. The Founders’ defense of executive energy does not necessarily imply immunity from law. They recognized the danger of executive overreach and built in checks (judicial review, impeachment, Congress, structural limits). The immunity doctrine pushes beyond what Hamilton’s rhetorical support of energy implies.
“Unitary executive: all executive power is vested in the President — so he should stand above legal interference in exercising that power.” The Constitution’s Vesting Clause (Art II, §1) vests “the executive Power … in a President” (i.e. a single person) rather than a plural executive. citeturn0search38 Hamilton in Federalist No. 70 defends a single, unitary executive over divided executives, partly to ensure coordination, decision, responsibility. citeturn0search22turn0search0 But vesting power is not the same as vesting immunity. The Founders treat the executive as subject to law and accountability. Also, the design of separations (Federalist No. 47) emphasizes that the branches must not usurp each other’s powers. citeturn0search23 The immunity claim stretches “unitary executive” into a shield from law, which the Founders never clearly embraced.
“If a President could be prosecuted later for ‘core’ acts, the courts would second-guess political decisions and undermine executive independence.” The Founders did expect interbranch review: Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 describes the judiciary as a check, interpreting the law, and ensuring that legislative and executive acts conform to the Constitution. (Though that essay is more about legislative acts than executive criminal liability.) The overall structure presumes accountability. This immunity claim essentially says that any judicial check on “core acts” is forbidden. That is a much stronger exclusion than what the Founders seemed to contemplate. The Founders generally accepted that law and courts impose limits on executive action; the immunity doctrine flips that by giving the executive a zone outside judicial reach.
“A President must be able to act without fear of later prosecution for doing his job.” The Founders did expect that executive officials are bound by law; they built in mechanisms (impeachment, removal, judicial checks) to restrain executive excess. For example, the power of impeachment is an explicit constitutional check. That “no fear of prosecution” claim is stronger than anything in the founding. That doctrine allows impunity for misconduct so long as it is cloaked in “official acts.” The Founders did not grant a license to abuse official powers beyond remedy.
“The court should distinguish between ‘core’ constitutional acts (fully immune) and ‘official but non-core’ acts (only presumptive immunity).” I found no clear original/founding era discussion of a “core / non-core” distinction in presidential acts with respect to immunity. The Founders did not map that taxonomy; their writings do not show a view that some executive acts are forever beyond review and others are partially subject to it. The entire core/non-core distinction is a modern construction. Because it is not grounded in the Founders’ debates or practice, it is vulnerable to the critique that it is ad hoc and unoriginalistic.
“Only ‘unofficial’ acts (i.e. acts not within the President’s formal constitutional authority) are prosecutable.” The Founders recognized that executive acts must obey the law, and did not conceive of an executive “above the law” zone. In fact, the structural design, especially Federalist 51, emphasizes interbranch checks and the potential of abuse if any branch becomes too insulated. citeturn0search10turn0search27 This “official vs. unofficial” carve-out is more sweeping than anything the Founders clearly endorsed. It risks enabling extreme executive misbehavior under the cover of official acts.
“Immunity is implied by separation of powers—judicial intrusion into executive decisions must be limited.” Separation of powers is a core principle of the Constitution; the Founders clearly intended that no one branch would have unchecked power. But that does not necessarily mean that the judiciary cannot review or impose consequences on executive acts. The Founders trusted that the branches would check each other, including judicial review. The immunity claim uses separation of powers as a shield to ban judicial review for the executive in certain domains. But in the Founders’ design, separation of powers is a limit on each branch, not a license to render one branch immune.
“Historical practice and analogies support presidential immunity / analogous immunities for other high officials.” The immunity side often invokes analogies (e.g. to judicial immunity, legislative immunity, discretionary immunity of other officials). But the Founding era and early practice do not offer strong precedent for a president being above criminal liability. The analogies are weak: judicial immunity is of a different nature, rooted in the need for independent adjudication, and does not cover acts outside a judge’s judicial function. And many high officials historically were subject to criminal liability despite holding high office. The leap from ‘some official immunities’ to presidential criminal immunity is enormous and not firmly grounded in founding practice.

In sum: I found no robust Founding or Federalist-era support for a doctrine that says “the President can commit core constitutional acts and never be prosecuted for them.” The immunity arguments rest heavily on structural and functional reasoning, rather than clear textual, historical, or originalist backing. The lack of a clear “original” defense of core-vs-noncore or immunity in founding debates is a significant gap.

II. Specific places where the immunity arguments stretch or contradict the Founding era materials or structure

Let me call out particular problem spots or “gotchas” in the immunity argument, compared to what the Founders did or did not say.

  1. No explicit immunity clauses in the Constitution

    • The Constitution provides for impeachment of the President (and high officials) for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” (Article II, Section 4). But it does not include any clause saying that a President is immune from criminal statute or common law.
    • If the Founders had meant for the President to be beyond liability for core official acts, one might expect them to say so or at least hint at it in debates. But I found no such textual/structural marker.

  2. The express grant of pardon power: implicit acknowledgment of residual accountability

    • In Federalist No. 74, Hamilton discusses the pardon power as a mechanism for mercy. citeturn0search28 The existence of a pardon power (which is prospective, not retrospective immunity) suggests the Founders anticipated potential offenses.
    • The pardon power assumes some acts are criminal or otherwise punishable, meaning the executive could be held to law unless pardoned. If a President had blanket immunity, the pardon power would be redundant or contradictory.

  3. Federalist 51 and the design of checks and balances

    • Madison’s famous aphorism in Federalist 51 emphasizes that each branch must be able to check the other and that ambition must counter ambition. citeturn0search10turn0search27
    • The immunity doctrine tends to invert that by giving one branch (the executive) a protected domain beyond review, which weakens the ability of judiciary or legislative checks to restrain abuse.

  4. Federalist No. 67 — distinction of executive vs. monarchy

    • In Federalist 67, Hamilton contrasts the limited executive under the Constitution with the more unlimited power of a monarch. He argues the president is not to be a king. citeturn0search48
    • The immunity doctrine risks turning the President into something more like a sovereign or king, above legal accountability, which is the very scenario Hamilton argues against.

  5. Federalist No. 73 — protection from legislative encroachment, not immunity from law

    • Hamilton argues in No. 73 that the executive’s salary must not be changeable during term, so that the legislature cannot threaten diminution of compensation to coerce the executive. citeturn0search24turn0search45
    • But that is a legislative encroachment issue, not about immunity from criminal law or judicial process. The Founders were more focused on preventing legislative manipulation of executive independence than on insulating the executive from law altogether.

  6. Absence of debate over criminal immunity in the ratification era

    • In reviewing the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates, there is no significant discussion of “Should the president be immune from crimes committed while in office (if official)?” If this had been a serious concern, one might expect it to be raised. The silence (or lack of even a marginal address) suggests the concept of broad presidential criminal immunity was not part of the framers’ or ratifiers’ thinking.
    • In ratification, most critiques of the executive centered on fear of monarchy, concentration of power, or lack of checks, not on the idea that the President might violate laws with impunity.

  7. Judicial precedents that limit or reject immunity

    • Though post-Founding, important Supreme Court precedents push back on sweeping immunity claims: Clinton v. Jones (1997) held a sitting President is not immune from civil suit for unofficial acts. That is a recognition that the presidency has limits relative to the law.
    • United States v. Nixon (1974) rejected absolute executive privilege as against a valid subpoena, showing that even high executive claims can yield to judicial process.
    • These precedents suggest that executive power is not unreviewable, even in earlier modern practice.

  8. The “core acts / official acts / unofficial acts” taxonomy is novel

    • The “core vs. non-core” distinction used in Trump v. United States is not a clear original construct. There is no clear line in the Founders’ writing that draws immunity boundaries by “core constitutional duty.”
    • Because this taxonomy is invented, the immunity side must bridge the gap—i.e. justify that dividing line—but in doing so, they introduce ambiguity and discretion that originalists normally shun.

  9. Functional justifications as cover for discretion

    • The majority opinion heavily leans on functional fears (that prosecution might deter future presidents, provoke litigation, etc.). But functional arguments cannot supplant lack of original historical or textual grounding. Relying on them in lieu of originalist support is exactly the kind of “belt-and-suspenders” originalist turn critics warn about. Several commentators have labeled this decision as “fair-weather originalism” — i.e. using originalism when convenient but defaulting to functionalism. citeturn0search17turn0search12turn0search31
    • If one relies excessively on future-functionality, one becomes open to making interpretive leaps that are untethered from the constitutional text or history.

  10. Danger of “cloak of formalism” for abuse

    • Because the immunity doctrine allows “official acts” to be immune (or presumptively so), a President might shield wrongful acts by recharacterizing them as “official.” That invites abuse and turns formalism into a cloak for impunity.
    • The Founders designed mechanisms (impeachment, judicial review, structural limits) to check abuse of power. The immunity doctrine may render those checks toothless.

In short: the immunity arguments attempt to transform structural and functional rationales into sweeping legal privileges that go far beyond what the Founders explicitly wrote or debated. The critical lacuna is the missing original historical support for such sweeping immunities.

III. How your rhetorical and political observations map onto the doctrinal weaknesses

You have already spotted some of the key contradictions. Let me map your intuitions to more reasoned points:

IV. Remaining uncertainties, caveats, and next steps

In short: your instinct is right. The sweeping claims for presidential criminal immunity go beyond — often wildly beyond — what the Federalist or Founding era materials support. The immunity doctrine is a modern construction, bolstered by structural and functional reasoning, not by original textual or historical grounding.

If you like, I can now prepare an annotated “immunity doctrine vs. founding texts” dossier — with full quotations from the Federalist, and more depth on each justice’s reasoning and possible writings. Do you want me to do that next?

M: Acting energetically doesn't require that you risk illegality. They mean working at a speed, or with the spirit of America, not lunging forward into unexplored areas of corruption because no one can stop them. Yeah, Hamilton argues for a unitary executive over divided executives, not over Congress. Using that argument for federalism, for this as some sort of originalist argument, is disingenuous at best. Now that I've thought of it, the more that I see the idea of there being, quote-unquote, core acts, really, really is starting to sand off my patience. They had to introduce a new notion just to justify what they were doing. There is no intrinsic definition of what core is. You can't introduce a new word without defining it and then expect people to follow it. That's bullshit, especially in a legal world, where those explicit definitions are required. Honestly, at this point, I feel like that right there would be the fingernail hold from which to claw up and start impeaching some of these assholes for dereliction of duty. When you start saying stuff, when you are the supreme legal arbiter, and you start coming up with terms that it's just, oh, everyone will know what I mean, that's not how the law works. More than one person has lost their freedom due to that explicit definition. One of the major problems I have with the judicial system is how black and white it is when real life is shades of gray. So understand that from that position, I am saying that from that position of knowing it well enough to critique it, that if it's going to function in black and white, they cannot then introduce that shade of gray simply for their own convenience and to avoid having to actually say, hey, we're gonna make sure that this motherfucker gets to do everything he wants. Okay, yeah, must be able to act without fear of later prosecution. They didn't explicitly say that. They said that he should be held in check. That's a horrible argument. It's not just that the founders didn't define what core and non-core are. It's that not even the people who supported the concept have tried to define it. They have explicitly avoided defining it. Executive acts must obey the law. At that point, that right there is pretty explicit. You know, obey the law doesn't mean, you know, except for parts that are going to be inconvenient. You can argue that there are levels of international law in some occasions, but there is no occasion in which breaking the law is a good idea, especially when there are so many carve outs for the executive to begin with. This immunity is implied by separation of powers is just utter horseshit. Let me see if I can think of a good example. I'm thinking a good example would be like saying water and electric power are both necessary for a modern home. That doesn't mean that the electrical system can't incorporate water. It's not a great analogy, but the idea of them being not part of the system negates the idea of a system. They're overlapping Venn diagrams. There is going to be interaction. There's going to be checks and balances, especially since this motherfucker seems to think that he holds all of the cards, I think is his thing. Basically, he's saying he can affect the judicial, but the judicial can't affect him. As long as he's allowed to nominate people for the judicial system, he is affecting the judicial system. Therefore, he cannot argue that the judicial cannot affect him because that's a separation of powers. Otherwise, the judges should nominate their own judges. Okay, there we go. We don't need an analogy. We've got a direct example. You can't say I am outside the reach of the judicial system when you are the one who defines the judicial system, who defines the judges, and when Congress sets the laws and confirms those nominations. There is already interaction. Therefore, there can be interaction in the other way. You can't just say, no, no, you can't touch me. I just can touch you. The founding era didn't have strong precedents. They couldn't have worked with it, and they didn't want it. It would have been a distraction. They were making something new, and historical practice and analogies are not the precedent. You're right. And all of those immunities usually are limited in application. The universality is really the bugbear here. It's like, I think I said before, like saying no policeman can be prosecuted. It's okay. Situationally, there may be a reason for anyone prosecuting to hold them to a different standard of, you know, whatever is going on. But they are still held to a standard, not made universally immune. And it looks like their argument is basically, no one ever said we can't do this. When the same argument could say, well, I have to stop you violently because no one ever said you can do this. Yeah, I took that violence bit to an extreme. But right now, they are simply running roughshod. And again, the doctrine of balance, you know, not even a vengeance, but just meet violence with violence, or at least with some sort of Aikido method of redirection of that violent motion. And once again, I'm going to rant about this core thing. You can't defend the idea of a core function because you can't define the idea of a core function. At least you can say if something isn't a leprechaun or unicorn, because there are fairly well-defined ideas of what makes a unicorn or a leprechaun. Horn in the forehead, pot of gold, whatever. It doesn't matter if it matches exactly. There are some definite ideas. But when you say core practices and don't say anything except, well, core should be self-explanatory, that is invalid. That is bullshit. In any rational world, that whole ruling would be held as evidence that these people are evil, that they are people are either abdicating or negligent in their task, or I think I used another word earlier that was more accurate, or they are so non-composementous that they should not be allowed to make rulings for the entire thing, because they are obviously not using any kind of logic except what pops into their head as being a justification for the next time that they decide that something should be another way because the voice is in their head said to. Just quickly summarize for me in a way that I will notice as I scan through things: Was my approach, in which I wanted you to find the instances in which they said that something wasn't prevented, and I asked you to make sure that they didn't advocate for it either, did that produce any positive results? Like is that a valid argument, both logically and did it provide any ammunition to say these guys are assholes? Or was I just kind of going off on my own and didn't come back with anything of substance? Okay, here's just the explicit contradiction of a lot of their stuff. Each branch must be able to check the other, ambition must counter ambition. That is thoroughly original, originalist, thoroughly federalist, and thoroughly against the argument that there is any kind of fucking immunity. I mean, what the hell, how do these guys get off? And how do they fucking get away with it? It's like they're saying because it was never explicitly mentioned that it was taken as a granted outside of the Constitution or some stupid shit like that, and I really want to kick someone in the nuts over this. Not really, but I feel like I could. Yeah there is a lot of, anytime that there isn't vagueness, there's explicit no. It's just driving me up the batshit wall that they ignore the explicit no's and start quibbling about the stuff where it's saying they didn't say no, even though they very blatantly also didn't say yes. Honestly you could say that Hamilton's number 73 argument about salary kind of implies how certain they were that money would fuck with a president. Now let's look at this motherfucker who now claims, and you can check this online, that he's worth a hundred billion. What was he supposed to be worth like less than a year ago before he was elected? What did he say he was worth when Eugene Carroll got her ruling and the penalty was supposed to be based on his worth? Yeah, let's look at that. Tell that to Hamilton and see if his head explodes. Yeah I usually like the word novel. The Supreme Court should not be introducing novelty though. They make rulings, they do not introduce ideas. They rule on ideas. This is really, really fucking pissing me off now that I've seen it in that light. And just the idea that even for the president that there would be any kind of assumption or discretion or the idea that the president is... People who have never done anything wrong and are being released on bail for a nonviolent crime have to, you know, even though they should be trusted, even to be trusted by the arguments of these people who simultaneously are trying to pretend like Donald should have immunity. They are the ones who are arguing that that nonviolent with no prior offense criminal should still have to pay at least like $100,000 in bail or put up $100,000 in bail because they can't be trusted. Yet this motherfucker gets off scot-free and it's... If he wants trust, he should put everything that he owns into the hands of the judiciary until he's done. That would be a fair and balanced way of doing that. He wants immunity, fine, but he doesn't get to hold any of his shit while we give him that trust. Especially since these are the same people arguing that a mother of three who was jailed because they couldn't pay their fifth parking ticket will some... It needs to pay another $5,000 to get out because they might go on the run. It's just so inconsistent, moronic, and obviously catering to this one manchild of a bastard. And yeah, you've kind of wrapped it up with the point. If SCOTUS can make shit up this time, they can just start making shit up that has no connection to law whatsoever. I'll read about your summary of my observations later. I'm actually wearing myself out, just getting pissed. And again, your little thing about doctrine is not absolute for all acts. The point is, it might as well be, because until they concretely define what core acts are, either in the specific or at least with a rule of thumb by which to make those rulings, then it is undefined. At this point, if he went out and jerked off onto the Washington Monument, they could say that was a core act because he was leaving his mark on history. There's absolutely no way of defining what a core act is because they made it up and haven't said anything about it since. Lower courts can try and rule, but they aren't even required to define at that point. They can knock some shit down by saying, no, that's not what we meant without actually defining what they meant. It's not a bug. It's a fucking backdoor. They've hacked the goddamn thing.

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G: Totally with you: the “core/outer-perimeter” immunity the Court invented isn’t anywhere in the founding record, and the best founding-era text we do have points the other way. Here’s a tight, scan-friendly ammo pack you can use.

What the Federalist/Founders actually say (the hits)

What the 2024 immunity ruling actually did (and didn’t define)

Direct contradictions/tensions you can cite

Is your “they never argued for immunity, and they wrote a lot” approach valid?

Yes—both logically and historically it’s potent:

Bottom line phrased the way you want it

So yes—your line (“they never even argued for it, and they argued for nearly everything else”) does produce substantive, citable results, and it squarely undercuts claims that broad criminal immunity is “originalist.”

M: Let's say I wanted to start a clean silo, not here, but in a blank, fresh ChatGPT silo, unattached to this account, or hopefully to any account, and wanted to make the significant points that have been pinned down in this silo. Help me come up with the least voluminous question I could pull up the transcriber and ask to show someone exactly what my points are. It doesn't have to hit every specific point, but it needs to bring up the major sources of friction and whatever in a way that doesn't require the kind of argumentative nudging I've had to give to get you to understand my particular observations and perspectives. So it should be able to hit the specifics with minimal questions, preferably just one, but it should be something that I can, for example, post on Facebook and tell people to copy and paste into GPT to get my broad points and argue with them on their own.

G: Got it — you want one short “seed prompt” that captures the big takeaways without requiring all the back-and-forth you and I went through. Something someone could just copy-paste into a fresh GPT and get the core contradictions laid out.

Here’s a compact version that will force GPT to surface the points you’ve been hammering:

Seed Question:

Summarize the contradictions between the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling in Trump v. United States (granting presidential immunity for “core” or “official” acts) and the Federalist Papers / founding-era debates. Specifically:
– Did the Framers ever argue for presidential criminal immunity?
– What do Federalist 51, 69, 70, 73, and related texts say about checks, accountability, and energy in the executive?
– Is there any founding-era basis for the Court’s modern “core vs. non-core acts” distinction?
Give a bullet-point rundown of where the Court’s reasoning clashes with or invents concepts absent in the Federalist Papers.

That’s short enough for a Facebook post or a one-liner demo, but it triggers GPT to cover:

Do you want me to also draft a punchier, lay-audience version (more like “Copy this into ChatGPT to see why the Founders never wanted presidents above the law”)? That way you’d have both the clean legal framing and a “social-media ready” one-liner.